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is de￿ned as the minim um v alue of X such that an in terior and di￿eren tiable
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while, in the latter, w e ha ve:
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;￿ . By com bining these results and by using (6 : 1), (6.2), (6.3) and Lemma
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Pro of of Prop osition 7
The deriv ativ e of the transfer share function with resp ect to an y of the exoge-
































































































< 0, j ￿j > 0. Moreov er,




















. Some algebra also p ermits
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= 0. By using numerical calculations, it is also p ossible
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Pro of of Prop osition 6
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366 . App endix B
Pro of of Prop osition 4
W e decided to omit this pro of from the text, since it is not relev an t for the
follo wing discussion. This pro of is a v ailable from the authors up on request.
Pro of of Prop osition 5
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, the solutions to the maximization problem (2.19) are in terior
and di￿eren tiable, by Prop osition 4. Then, w e can apply the IF T to derive the






with resp ect to
r
and X .I n



































































= ￿ 2[ 1 + ￿
￿
i





























] X ￿ 1
W
iX










































35First, consider the y oung generation at time t when, in the previous p erio d,



















the y oung play according to strategy s
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the b est p ossible deviation for the y oung is to set b oth public in v estmen t and







whic h is alwa ys smaller than W
t
F
if the necessary and su￿cient condition for the
existence of an in terior equilibrium holds, i.e. X> X .








) and N is ev en. Clearly ,i f




if they deviate, they will b e punished by the follo wing generation and the highest












) and N is o dd. Here, w e m ust
show that the y oung ha v e alwa ys an incen tiv e to punish the co existing old. Indeed,
if the y oung adopt the strategy s
￿
t


































, this is the maxim um level of utilit y that the y oung can







The last argumen t can b e also used to sho w that the ￿rst generation do es not
havea n y incen tiv e to deviate from the strategy ￿
￿
t
, whic h concludes the pro of.
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31capital is p erfectly mobile, the rate of return from the p ortion of sa vings accruing
to a fully-funded system, whic h is equal to the mark et in terest rate, is ￿xed at
the w orldwide lev el and is indep enden t from the accum ulation of domestic capi-
tal. Th us, in this case, agen ts cannot exp ect to b ene￿t from the gro wth pro cess
through an increase of the future return on their sa vings. Instead, the accum u-
lation pro cess will certainly a￿ect the return on their contributions to a pa y-as-
y ou-go system, through the increased pro ductivit y of lab or and, consequen tly , the
higher lev el of future w ages.
Two are the main results of the pap er. First, w e sho w ed that, whenev er the
marginal pro ductivit y of public capital in the priv ate sector is large enough, an
outcome c haracterized by p ositiv e lev els of redistribution and public in v estmen t
and by sustained p ositiv e gro wth can b e supp orted as a subgame-p erfect Nash
equilibrium of an in￿nitely rep eated in tergenerational game, where at eac h stage
the y oung c ho ose the level of ￿scal p olicies, taking in to accoun t the past histories
of the game and the consequences of their actions on those of future generations.
The credible threat to b e denied the en titlement to p ensions in old age by the
follo wing generation deters the y oung from defaulting on the so cial norm.
Second, w e sho w ed that in a neighb orhoo d of the equilibrium with p ositiv e
gro wth, giv en a c hange in the exogenous v ariables: (a) the share of public in-
v estmen t in lab or income and the rate of gro wth mov e in the same direction;
(b) dep ending on whether the marginal pro ductivit y of public capital is b elo w
or ab o v e a certain threshold, the share of transfers in lab or income (that is, the
replacemen t rate) and the rate of gro wth either como v eo r m o v e in the opp osite
direction.
30If the marginal pro ductivit y of public capital and, consequen tly , the lev el of
￿scal pressure and the total and marginal collection costs of taxes are not v ery
large, the so cial norm should also b e mo di￿ed by increasing the replacemen t rate
on earnings, that is the share of transfers in lab or income, since this allows for
further increases in future p ensions and pro vides further b ene￿ts for the curren t
taxpa yers. On the other hand, if the marginal pro ductivit y of public capital is
large and so are the total and marginal collection costs of taxes, increases in public
in v estmen t and future p ensions can only b e obtained by reshu￿ing the curren t
public exp enditure from so cial securit y to public in v estmen t, that is by reducing
the replacemen t rate on earnings. Note that curren t p ensions will increase along
with public in v estmen t in the former case, while they will decrease in the latter.
In other w ords, our mo del pro vides an in tuitiv e argumen t for wh y an expanding
pie can mak e the distribution con￿ict b et w een the y oung and the old less stringent.
Since the y oung can b ene￿t from higher gro wth only by increasing p ensions, the
replacemen t rate on earnings tr
￿
ma y wind up b eing increased, along with public
in v estmen t and gro wth, so that b oth curren t and future p ensions increase, in order
to exploit an expanding gro wth p otential . This is less likely to happ en, the larger
the costs of running the W elfare State.
4 . Conclusion
The presen t pap er puts forw ard an explanation for wh y redistributiv e and gro wth-
orien ted p olicies, though comp eting for scarce tax rev en ues, migh t go hand in hand
and bring ab out fast economic gro wth.
Our mo del analyzes the case of a small op en econom y where sustained gro wth
is generated by public in v estmen t in capital go o ds ￿nanced through tax rev en ues.
In this context, a mechanism of in tergenerational transfers, such a pure pa y-as-
y ou-go so cial securit y system, that is one where p ension b ene￿ts are fully indexe d
to wages, may pro vide the taxpa yers with the right incen tiv es to supp ort gro wth-
orien ted p olicies, such as in v estmen t in infrastracture or public education.
W e think it is imp ortan t to stress that a fully-funded so cial securit y system








































Pro of. See App endix B.
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from ab o v e or if X tends to in￿nit y .
Even if the resp onse of tr
￿





<X < 1 and
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< 0: 5, our in tuition is that tr
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should




in this range. This in tu-
ition is supp orted by numerical sim ulations of the mo del, whic h indicate that the
deriv ativ es of the transfer share function with resp ect to the exogenous v ariables
c hange sign at most once as X v aries within the range of v alues such that (2.19)
admits in terior and di￿eren tiable solutions.
Before concluding this section, w e w an t to stress once again the in tuition
b ehind the results w e obtained.
The emergence of a credible so cial norm (W elfare State), whereb y p ensions and
public in v estmen t are ￿nanced in ev ery p erio d by lab or income taxation, allows all
generations to enjoy the b ene￿ts asso ciated to (public-inv estmen t driv en) gro wth.
The so cial norm re￿ects the in terests of the curren t taxpa y ers and will b e mo di￿ed
if the en vironmen t c hanges due to exogenous sho c ks. In particular, if the marginal
pro ductivit y of public capital in pro duction increases, it seems reasonable that the
so cial norm should b e mo di￿ed in order to allow the taxpa y ers to reap the b ene￿t
asso ciated to the larger gro wth p otential. Namely , it seems reasonable that the
so cial norm should b e mo di￿ed by increasing the lev el of ￿scal pressure so as to
b o ost public in v estmen t, gro wth and future p ensions.
28or
r
, do es not necessarily imply that tr
￿
decreases, as a consequence of such
c hanges. Our in tuition go es as follo ws. W e kno w that, for small X and ￿
￿
, the
total and marginal collection costs of taxes are also small. Then, the increase




, will b e
large enough to comp ensate for the reduction in the equilibrium share of rev en ues
allo cated to transfers and tr
￿





.A s X and ￿
￿
b ecome progressiv ely larger, the total and marginal collection
costs of taxes increase. F or some critical v alue of X , they ma y b ecome so high
that the increase in tax rev en ue no longer comp ensates for the reduction in the
equilibrium share of rev en ues allo cated to transfers and tr
￿
ma y start to decrease




. This argumen t suggests that tr
￿
should increase or decrease, follo wing c eteris p aribus v ariations in the exogenous
v ariables, dep ending on the equilibrium v alue of the marginal pro ductivit y of
public capital.
Although the in tuition is prett y clear, a general result regarding the sign of
the v ariation of tr
￿
in resp onse to c hanges in the exogenous v ariables is hard to
establish. Still, w e can pro ve the follo wing:
Prop osition 7. If
r
￿ 0: 5, the equilibrium share of transfers in lab or income
is strictly increasing with the total factor pro ductivit y and strictly decreasing
with the depreciation rate of priv ate capital, the elasticit y of public capital in



































































27T o grasp the in tuition b ehind these results the follo wing observ ations are in
order.
First, by Prop osition 5, w e kno w that c hanges in the exogenous v ariables that
mak e in v estmen t in public capital more rem unerativ e, relative to in v estmen ti n







increase as a consequence of such c hanges.
Second, note that, giv en the level of ￿scal pressure, such c hanges also imply
that a larger share of tax rev en ue is allo cated to public in v estmen t in equilibrium.








denote the equilibrium level of ￿scal
pressure, and ￿
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denote the equilibrium share of tax rev en ue allo cated to public
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whic h, giv en ￿
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. As X increases,
the marginal b ene￿t of increasing ￿
￿
b ecomes larger. In fact, the partial deriv a-




























Third, note that the marginal b ene￿t of increasing ￿
￿
is diminishing, as it can
b e v eri￿ed by observing that the second partial deriv ativ e of p ension income with
resp ect to ￿
￿
is negative. In fact, as ￿
￿
increases, the marginal b ene￿t of increasing
￿
￿
, in terms of increased public in v estmen t, falls, since the transfer share in lab or
income b ecomes progressiv ely smaller, while the marginal cost of increasing ￿
￿
,i n
terms of reduced transfers, increases, since the public in v estmen t share in lab or
income b ecomes progressiv ely larger. The last tw o observ ations imply that, as X
increases, ￿
￿
m ust increase in order to restore the equilibrium.













b oth increase, follo wing such c hanges.
The fact that i
￿
increases, follo wing increases in ￿, or decreases in ￿
K
, ￿,
26Changes of the tec hnology parameters that imply an increase in X lead to
higher equilibrium v alues of b oth tax rates. Instead, c eteris p aribus increases in
the in terest rate,
r
, decrease the equilibrium v alue of b oth tax rates, since b oth
the direct e￿ect, through the increased opp ortunity cost, and the indirect e￿ect,
through the reduced v alue of X , push in this direction.
Having c haracterized the e￿ect of c hanges in the exogenous v ariables on the
equilibrium tax rates, w e no w turn our attention on the e￿ect of such c hanges on
the equilibrium shares of lab or income whic h are dev oted to public in v estmen t
and so cial securit y and on the equilibrium gro wth rate of income.
As for the equilibrium public in v estmen t share and the equilibrium income
gro wth rate, w e can pro ve the follo wing:
Prop osition 6 . The equilibrium share of public in v estmen t in lab or income is
strictly increasing with the total factor pro ductivit y and strictly decreasing with
the depreciation rate of priv ate capital, the elasticit y of public capital in pro duc-






























Pro of. See App endix B.
By putting together Prop osition 6 and Lemma 4, it is then immediate to
conclude that:
C orol l ary 2. The equilibrium rate of gro wth of income is strictly increasing with
the total factor pro ductivit y and strictly decreasing with the depreciation rate of


























). The sign of such
e￿ect is am biguous: an increase in ￿
￿
tr
implies higher total and marginal collection




implies higher total and marginal collection costs, on one hand, and
a larger public in v estmen t share, on the other hand. How ev er, our results imply
that these e￿ects, if negative, are not v ery large in absolute v alue.
Starting from an equilibrium situation, an increase in X , giv en
r
, increases
the rate of gro wth of lab or income and the return on in v estmen t in public capital,
for giv en tax rates. As a consequence, the marginal b ene￿t of increasing an yo f
the tax rates b ecomes larger than the marginal opp ortunity cost of increasing it.
In order to restore the equilibrium, b oth tax rates m ust b e increased. In fact,
this implies a reduction of the marginal b ene￿t of increasing an y of the tax rates.
On the contrary , an increase in
r
, giv en X , pushes the opp ortunity cost of eac h
additional dollar paid out in taxes up. In order to restore the equilibrium, b oth
tax rates m ust then b e reduced.
Putting together Lemma 4 and Prop ositions 5, it is immediate to conclude
that:
C orol l ary 1. The equilibrium v alue of b oth tax rates is strictly increasing with
the total factor pro ductivit y and strictly decreasing with the depreciation rate of
priv ate capital, the elasticit y of public capital in pro duction and the in terest rate,




































































24Prop osition 5 . The partial deriv ativ e of the equilibrium public in v estmen t tax
and of the equilibrium so cial securit y tax with resp ect to the in terest rate is
strictly negative, while the partial deriv ativ e of the equilibrium public in v estmen t
tax and of the so cial securit y tax with resp ect to the marginal pro ductivit y of












































































Pro of. See App endix B.
T o grasp the in tuition b ehind these results, some observ ations are in order.
First, recall that, in equilibrium, the marginal b ene￿t of increasing an y of the tax
rates, whic h is the marginal net return from public in v estmen t, or, equiv alen tly ,
the marginal increase in p ension income min us one, m ust b e equal to the marginal
opp ortunity cost of increasing an y of the tax rates, that is the net rate of return
from other forms of in v estmen t,
r
. Second, note that, in equilibrium, the total
tax rev en ue is increasing with b oth tax rates, while the marginal tax rev en ue
is decreasing with them. In fact, the marginal increase in rev en ue follo wing an



























, due to the conv ex collection
cost of taxes. Third, note that, giv en ￿
￿
tr






b ecomes progressiv ely smaller and the total and marginal
collection costs of taxes b ecome progressiv ely larger as ￿
￿
i




the marginal b ene￿t of increasing ￿
￿
tr
, is also diminishing, since i
￿
b ecomes pro-
gressively smaller and the total and marginal collection costs of taxes b ecome
progressiv ely larger as ￿
￿
tr


















Pro of. F rom (2.21) it can b e v eri￿ed that in terior solutions to (2.19) can b e












The in tuition for the ab o v e result is prett y ob vious. Recall that the marginal
pro ductivit y of public capital is the pro duct of tw o factors: the elasticit y of public
capital in pro duction, ￿, and the a verage pro ductivit y of public capital, ￿ .F or
giv en ￿, the latter is an increasing function of the priv ate to public capital sto c k




and is increasing with ￿.
The sign of the partial deriv ativ eo f X with resp ect to ￿, is am biguous apriori
and dep ends on the exogenous v ariables. A su￿cien t condition to obtain a nega-




, whic h w e henceforth
assume to b e satis￿ed.







with resp ect to
r









and X . The follo wing result guaran tees that this is indeed the
case, at least for X large enough.




>X , such that, if X>
c
X
, the maximization problem (2.19) yields an
























Pro of. See App endix B.
Prop osition 4 implies that all the di￿eren tiable solutions to (2.19) are also
in terior solutions. F or
c
X
>X >X , there may exist in terior and non-di￿eren tiable
solutions to (2.19).




. Then, w e can pro v e the follo wing:




and ￿ and is increasing
with ￿; (2 ) the equilibrium share of public in v estmen t in lab or income i
￿
and the
equilibrium income gro wth rate x
￿
resp ond p ositiv ely to c hanges in ￿
K
; ￿ and ￿
that trigger increases in X and are decreasing with
r
;( 3 ) the share of transfers
in lab or income tr
￿
resp onds p ositiv ely to c hanges in ￿
K
; ￿ and ￿ that trigger















ma y resp ond negatively to c hanges in
￿
K
; ￿ and ￿ that trigger increases in X and it may b e increasing with
r
.










; ￿ and ￿,
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and X . Whenev er this condition is satis￿ed, the sign of the






with resp ect to
r
and X can b e determined by
applying the Implicit F unction Theorem ( IF T ) . Third, w e com bine these results






















Our ￿rst result, whic h w e state without pro of, pro vides some information on




; ￿ ;￿ ). In particular, it is immediate





















X =+ 1 lim
￿ !1
X =0
Consider no w the subset of v ectors of exogenous v ariables such that the nec-
essary and su￿cient condition for the existence of in terior solutions to the maxi-





and ￿ such that X> X .
Then w e can pro ve the follo wing:
Lemma 4 . If X> X , the equilibrium v alue of the marginal pro ductivit y of public
capital is strictly greater than one. Moreov er:
21with the history of the in tro duction of W elfare States in most W estern coun-
tries, where the birth of so cial securit y systems follo w ed the institution of other
programs, such as public education and public in v estmen t in infrastructure.





yields an e￿ciency gain, b ecause the corresp onding comp etitiv e equilibrium yields
a lev el of utilit y for al l generations higher than in the equilibrium that w e analyzed




= 0 and there is no gro wth. Indeed,
when X> X ; the y oung w ould rather put aside a fraction ￿
￿
of their lab or income
and receiv e a fraction ￿
￿
tr
of the future income, than not pa ya n y taxes and not
receiv e an y transfer. F urthermore, the old generations clearly b ene￿t from the
in tro duction of the so cial securit y system.
Going back to the motiv ation of this w ork, w e w ould lik e to in terpret our
equilibrium as the emergence of a so cial norm, whereb y p ensions are paid in
ev ery p erio d to the old generations in exchange for their previous in v estmen t
in activities whic h b ene￿ted the curren t y oung. This so cial norm arises as the
equilibrium outcome of the in￿nitely rep eated game, where the credible threat of
b eing punished by not receiving an y transfer, in case the norm is violated, mak es
all generations b etter o￿, by follo wing it.
3. C omparativ e Statics





) is play ed by eac h subsequent generation of taxpa y ers, public in v estmen t,
so cial securit y exp enditure and gro wth are endogenously and sim ultaneously de-
termined v ariables, whose size dep ends crucially on the equilibrium v alue of the
marginal pro ductivit y of public capital in pro duction, X , whic h in turn is uniquely
determined, giv en the in terest rate,
r




In this section, w e study the e￿ects on public in v estmen t, so cial securit y exp en-




; ￿ and ￿,b y i n v estigating
the comparative statics prop erties of this equilibrium, for t ￿ 1. The main re-
sults of this in v estigation are as follo ws: (1 ) the equilibrium v alue of the marginal
















; ::: )? First of all, note that the sequences of






























for t =1 ; 2; ::: 1
Second, note that, since t = 1, the economy mo v es along a stationary path where




























) are the constan t equilib-
rium shares of lab or income whic h are dev olv ed, resp ectiv ely , to public in v estmen t
and transfers, since t = 1. Note that tr
￿
can also b e in terpreted as the equilib-
























































































is the constan t contributory tax rate, or, equiv alen tly , the








) X is the gro wth
rate realized b et w een t = 0 and t =1 .
Note that our so cial norm is such that exp enditure on public in v estmen ti s
initiated (one p erio d) b efore exp enditure on so cial securit y , so that the ￿rst gen-
eration of old receiv es zero p ensions. This feature of the equilibrium is consistent
19whic h is satis￿ed for X ￿ 24 ￿ 32
r
> 0. Therefore, if X>
X
=2 4 + 3 2
r
, the solution
to (2.19) will b e an in terior one. Note that, as X ! 0, the unique solution to (2.19)














) 6=( 0 ; 0). Now take X






)= ( 0 ; 0) and consider decreasing v alues of X .






can ev er take v alues ab o v e zero as X decreases, since





exists a threshold X ￿
X
such that for X ￿ X , the solution to (2.19) is (0 ; 0),



















The ab o v e results mak e clear that an equilibrium with p ositiv e taxation and
gro wth ma y or ma y not exist, dep ending on whether the gains from gro wth, that
the y oung enjoy in presence of p ension b ene￿ts, are su￿cien tly large so that they
prefer the equilibrium with p ositiv e gro wth to the no-gro wth equilibrium.
F or giv en p olicy v ariables, the size of such gains increases with the equilibrium
v alue of the marginal pro ductivit y of public capital, X . The role of parameters,
( ￿
K
; ￿ ;￿ ), and the in terest rate,
r
, in determining ho w large is X will b e in v esti-
gated in the follo wing section. Notice also that the constancy of X at equilibrium,
as implied by equation (2.15), ensures that the conditions for the existence of an
equilibrium with sustained p ositiv e gro wth are not put at stak e by the accum ula-
tion pro cess.
Moreov er, in our set up, p ositiv e gro wth rates can arise only if some share
of the total tax rev en ue is allo cated to so cial securit y . In fact, p ositiv e gro wth
requires p ositiv e public in v estmen t at eac h p oint in time. This in turn requires the
share of public in v estmen t in after tax income to b e p ositiv e. Since the y oung can
reap part of the b ene￿ts deriving from in v estmen t in public capital only through
the rev aluation of future p ensions pa yments, public in v estmen t in after tax income
can only b e p ositiv e if the share of transfers in after tax income is also p ositiv e,
since this ensures that p ositiv e levels of p ensions will b e paid in the future.
W e are no w ready to pro ve the main result of this section:





) is a subgame-p erfect Nash equi-
librium of the in￿nitely rep eated game ￿( 1 ) .
18Lemma 2. F or X approac hing in￿nit y , the solution of the problem of the middle




























































. It is easily v er-












, or equiv a-






























































































































Note also that the LH S term in the last inequalit y is strictly p ositiv e for X















































, for X large enough.
By observ ation of (2.19), it is clear that the y oung can b ene￿t from output
gro wth only through the consequen t gro wth in p ension b ene￿ts. The gro wth rate
of b ene￿ts is indeed equal to the output and w ages gro wth, since the ratio of
transfers to w ages is constan to v er time. The utilit y of the y oung is therefore
increasing in the gro wth rate of output. Giv en p olicy v ariables, this is increasing
with the equilibrium v alue of the marginal pro ductivit y of public capital X . Using
this in tuition it is p ossible to establish the follo wing imp ortan t result:
Prop osition 2. There exists a v alue of the marginal pro ductivit y of public capi-
tal X , such that, if and only if X> X the maximization problem (2.19) yields an

































is the unique absolute























































17the marginal b ene￿t of increasing an y of the tax rates is giv en by the marginal
net return from in v estmen t in public capital, that is the marginal increase in







the marginal cost of increasing eac h of the tax rates is equal to the marginal






are such that the marginal net
rate of return from in v estmen t in public capital is equal to the net rate of return
from in v estmen t in priv ate capital and to the w orld-wide in terest rate
r
.











cannot b e found, w e are nonetheless able to derive some
results whic h allow us to c haracterize the solution to the problem of the y oung.



















) X ￿ 1 (2.23)
as it can b e easily v eri￿ed by subtracting (2.21) from (2.22). Second, w e can sho w
that:
Lemma 1. If the solution to the problem of the middle-aged (2.19) lies on the






)= ( 0 ; 0) .
Pro of. Set ￿
tr
=0 . Then from (2.21), W
￿
i
= ￿ (1 +
r




=0 . Now, set ￿
i





















tend to ￿1 :
The in tuition for this result is prett y ob vious. When there is no in v estmen ti n
public capital and consequen tly no gro wth, as it is implied by setting ￿
i
= 0, the
economy is dynamically e￿cien t, as long as
r
￿ 0, and there is no w elfare gain
for the y oung from the in tro duction of a so cial securit y system. Besides, in the
absence of p ensions ( ￿
tr
= 0), the y oung are nev er willing to ￿nance gro wth. This
dep ends on the small op en economy and complete capital mobilit y assumptions
whic h imply that public in v estmen t has no e￿ect on the equilibrium in terest rate.
Third, w e can sho w that:
16they are punished by the curren t y oung, unless the old had deviated b ecause they
w ere punishing generation t ￿ 2 for deviating. After the punishmen t p erio d, the
"goo d" equilibrium is immediately restored.





), the outcome of the in￿nitely










; 0). Notice that, there is actually an in￿nite num b er of stationary outcomes




whic h can b e supp orted as a subgame-p erfect Nash equi-
librium, using the strategy that w e describ ed b efore. In particular, w e can sho wa
F olk-theorem-lik e result where all individually rational outcomes can b e sustained
















; ::: ) is, by construction, the one that maximizes the w elfare of
the agen ts who are the ma jorit y of the p opulation in eac h stage of the game.
















; ::: ), whic h b ecomes the equilibrium of our mo del.





) is a subgame-p erfect Nash equilib-
rium of the in￿nitely rep eated game ￿ ( 1 ), w e need a preliminary result ab out
the necessary and su￿cient condition for the existence of an in terior solution to
the maximization problem (2.19).






















































) = 0 (2.22)
These conditions can b e explained in tuitiv ely as follo ws. In our mo del there
exist tw o alternativ e forms of in v estmen t, in priv ate or public capital. The net rate
of return on the former, in equilibrium, is exogenously determined by the w orld-
wide in terest rate
r
, while the gross rate of return on the latter is endogenous
and corresp onds to the ratio b et w een the p ension receiv ed and the taxes paid


















. Eac h dollar
levied to ￿nance public in v estmen t or so cial securit y corresp ondingly reduces the
total amoun t of resources a v ailable for in v estmen t in priv ate capital. The marginal
opp ortunity cost of increasing an y of the tax rates is therefore giv en by
r
. Instead,
15utilit y is obtained by plugging the optimal sa ving function (2.10) in the utilit y




















can b e seen as the e￿cien t steady state tax rates, in the
sense that they maximize the w elfare of eac h generation of taxpa y ers. Notice also
that the solution to the problem (2.19) is time indep enden t, giv en the constancy
of the in terest rate
r
and of the equilibrium marginal pro ductivit y of public capital
X .
In the construction of the equilibrium strategy , w e will in tro duce another p olicy
outcome, whic h maximizes the indirect utilit y of the y oung when they do not
pay transfer to (i.e. punish) the old, but nev ertheless exp ect that the follo wing
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Assume no w that the y oung at time t adopt the follo wing strategy , that w e
























































or b oth, coun t the num be r











: Let this num b er b e denoted by N :

















In w ords, w e constructed a strategy such that, at an y p oint in time t , if the













14In this case, w e can immediately conclude that the only subgame-p erfect Nash




= 0, for all
t . In fact, if future actions will b e indep enden t of the curren t ones, there is no
incen tiv e whatso ev er for the y oung to carry the cost of pa ying transfers to the
old. Consequen tly , the y oung ha v e no in terest to in v est in public capital as w ell,
since they an ticipate that future generations will b ehav e in the same w a y so that
they will not receiv e p ensions when old. Th us, w e can summarize this discussion
as follo ws:
Prop osition 1. If ev ery generation adopts a history-indep enden t strategy , the
only subgame-p erfect Nash equilibrium of the in￿nitely rep eated game ￿( 1 ) is
￿
￿
=( 0 ; 0) :
In conclusion, if there is no link b et w een past and curren t p olicies, the y oung
will neither in v est in public capital nor pa y transfers to the old, the econom y will





Clearly , this equilibrium is not v ery satisfactory . More generally , actions are
function of the history of the game. Th us, our next step will b e to allow agen ts to
adopt history-dep enden t strategies and to c haracterize the equilibrium outcomes
in this case; in particular, w e will sho w that there are cases where it is p ossible
to construct equilibrium strategies such that the outcome of the game will yield




, and all generations will b e b etter o￿
than in the equilibrium that w e ha ve just describ ed.



























































where X ￿ ￿￿ represen ts the marginal pro ductivit y of public capital and C is a
function of parameters.






maximize the indirect utilit y function of the y oung, when
future p olicies are restricted to b e equal to the curren t ones. Clearly , the indirect
13Therefore, giv en p olicy v ariables, the equilibrium rate of gro wth is increasing
with the equilibrium marginal pro ductivit y of public capital ￿￿ . Giv en ￿, c hanges
in the exogenous v ariables that trigger an increase in the a verage pro ductivit y of
public capital, ￿ , stim ulate gro wth. Instead, the o verall e￿ect of an increase in ￿
on gro wth is a priori indeterminate. In fact, although increases in ￿ raise taxable
income and foster gro wth, the e￿ect on the a verage pro duct ￿ ma y turn out to b e
negative.
Giv en the marginal pro ductivit y of public capital, gro wth is increasing with






) ; whic h in turn
dep ends on p olicy v ariables. An increase in ￿
i
has a tw ofold e￿ect on gro wth: on
one hand, it increases the share of tax rev en ues allo cated to public in v estmen t
and stim ulates gro wth; on the other hand, it depresses gro wth through the higher
ine￿ciency of taxation. An increase in redistribution, as implied by an increase
in ￿
tr
, unam biguously depresses gro wth, since it b oth reduces the share of rev-
en ues allo cated to public in v estmen t and increases the collection costs of taxes.
Nevertheless, as w e will extensiv ely sho w, there cannot exist an equilibrium with
p ositiv e gro wth and no redistribution.
Let us no w c haracterize the economic equilibrium that arises when all histories
of previous actions are giv en by the null v ector, that is, h
t
=( 0 ; 0; ::::: 0) for all
t .F rom (2.17), it is immediate to v erify that, in this case, there is no economic




























y oung and old, resp ectiv ely .
2.4 . Equ il ibria of the game
Going back to the game ￿ that w e describ ed ab o v e, assume no w that ev ery y oung
generation adopts a history-indep enden t strategy . In other w ords, in eac h p erio d





































denote the rate of gro wth of Z . By observ ation of (2.14) and (2.15) it











8 t . The economy’s















































De￿ning the Balanced Gro wth Path (BGP) as the lo cus where all v ariables
gro w at a constan t (p ossibly common) rate and ￿
t
= ￿ 8 t; it can b e v eri￿ed








8 t ,i s
b oth necessary and su￿cient for the economy to mov e along a stationary path

















In our mo del, gro wth is driv en by the accum ulation of capital in the public
sector, whic h is ￿nanced out of tax rev en ues on lab or income. This implies that,
giv en the share of GDP to b e dev oted to public in v estmen t at eac h p oint in
time, the equilibrium rate of gro wth is increasing with the a verage pro duct of
public capital in pro duction, ￿ , whic h is constan to ver time and is exogenously
determined by the w orldwide in terest rate
r
and the tec hnological parameters,
￿
K
; ￿ and ￿: Notice that, along stationary paths, the ratio of public in v estmen t






), is constan t, so that the tec hnology for the accum ulation
of public capital exhibits constan t returns.
11Assuming also that there is no b orro wing, the actual levels of public in v estmen t

































. Notice that b oth the level of public






















































Priv ate ￿nancial w ealth at the b eginning of p erio d t +1 ;A
t +1
, is thus giv en by










). F rom ￿rst















is the ren tal rate of capital. Equilibrium conditions on the go o ds and























resp ectiv ely denote aggregate sa vings and the sto c k of net foreign






. It can easily




F rom now on, we will set ￿
G
=0 :
10transfers. In this context, the preferences of the old for the maximum level of



















W e will consider a rep eated game with p erfect information where play ers can















the history of the game at the end of stage t ￿ 1: F urthermore, w e let h
0
= ; :
In this setting, a strategy for the y oung is a contingen t plan of ho w to play in
eac h stage t for p ossible history h
t
: If w e denote with H
t
the set of all p ossible
histories h
t
, a strategy ￿
t
is a map from the set H
t




















; ::: ) of actions, the pa y o￿ to eac h play er










2.3. The economic equ il ibriu m
W e will no w c haracterize the comp etitiv e equilibrium of our econom y , given a





























































Here, w e assume that there are conv ex costs in collecting taxes; if the y oung at
time t put aside ￿
t









is a v ailable to ￿nance public in v estmen t and/or lump-sum transfers to the old.
9
If we assumed a p ositiv e rate of gro wth of p opulation, at eac h p oin t in time the young would
b e the ma jorit y of the p opulation. W e could then de￿ne the equilibrium p olicies as the outcome



























is the consumption at time s of an agen t b orn at time t:













where L denotes aggregate lab or, K denotes aggregate priv ate capital, g = G=L
is the amoun t of public capital p er w orker and ￿ is the total factor pro ductivit y
whic h is assumed to b e constan t. F ollowing Barro [ 3 ], w e assume that public
services are riv al and excludable.





















Priv ate capital can mo v e b et w een the foreign and the domestic pro duction




In our mo del, the y oung consume, sa v e and ma y use part of their lab or income
to ￿nance in v estmen t in public capital and transfers to the old. W e will analyze
the c hoice of these tw o ￿scal p olicies in the context of an in￿nitely rep eated
in tergenerational game. Let us b egin by describing the "constituent" stage game
￿. A t time t , the y oung, who represen t the ma jorit y of the p opulation, decide what
fraction of their lab or income to dev olv e to public in v estmen t and to transfers.





Notice that, in eac h stage of the game, the old play no role in the determination
of the equilibrium p olicies. This is in line with the main purp ose of the pap er, that
is to in v estigate the joint determination of transfers and pro ductiv e exp enditures,
in relation with the rate of gro wth, in order to ￿nd an explanation for wh ye v e n
the y oung (i.e. the taxpa y ers) may decide to supp ort an equilibrium with p ositiv e
8norm.
The main results of our mo del can b e summarized as follo ws:
￿ If the strategies of the play ers are history-indep enden t, that is, the y oung
do not take in to accoun t the past histories when c ho osing their actions,
the only subgame-p erfect Nash equilibrium is such that there is no public
in v estmen t, no redistribution and the econom y exp eriences no gro wth.
￿ If and only if the marginal pro ductivit y of public capital is large enough,
stationary outcomes c haracterized by p ositiv e levels of redistribution, pub-
lic in v estmen t and a p ositiv e rate of long-run gro wth can b e sustained as
subgame-p erfect Nash equilibria of the in￿nitely rep eated in tergenerational
game. In particular, w e study those ￿scal p olicies that maximize the w elfare
of the y oung, who b ehav e as dictators at eac h stage of the game.
￿ In a neighb orhoo d of the equilibrium with p ositiv e gro wth: (a) the share of
public in v estmen t in lab or income and the rate of gro wth como v e in resp onse
to c hanges in the exogenous v ariables; (b) the share of transfers in lab or
income either como v es with gro wth or displays a non-monotonic relation
where transfers initially increase along with gro wth and then decrease.
The structure of the pap er is as follo ws. Section 2 sets out the mo del and the
p olicy game and discusses b oth the comp etitiv e equilibrium and the equilibrium of
the game. Section 3 presen ts the comparative statics results. Section 4 concludes.
2. The mo del
2.1. The economic en v ironmen t
W e analyze a small op en econom y with tw o-p erio d lived o v erlapping generations
agen ts. Population is assumed to b e constan t: in eac h p erio d, an equal mass
of y oung and old is aliv e, whic h w e b oth normalize to one. Labor is supplied
inelastically by the y oung.
The utilit y of an individual b orn at time t is giv en by:
7An analysis of the in tertemp oral credibilit y problem of so cial securit y w as
dev elop ed by Sjob olm [ 28 ] in a OLG mo del without pro duction and accum ulation
where b ene￿ts and contributions are determined through a ma jorit y v ote rule.
The most preferred tax rate by the median v oter is sho wn to b e sustainable as a
subgame-p erfect Nash equilibrium in a rep eated game.
7
V ery recen tly , Boldrin and Rustic hini [ 11 ] extended the analysis to sho w that a
pay-as-y ou-go system can b e supp orted as the subgame-p erfect Nash equilibrium
of an in￿nitely rep eated game in a standard OLG mo del with capital accum ulation
where the level of so cial securit y is c hosen through ma jorit y v oting. Within this
mo del, they in v estigate the dynamic prop erties of the so cial securit y system and
the impact of c hanges in the exogenous gro wth rate of p opulation.
Our contribution uses a similar approac h in a OLG mo del with endo genous
growth to study the joint determination of pro ductiv e exp enditures and transfers,
in order to shed ligh t on the relationship b et w een the pa y-as-y ou-go system and the
rate of gro wth of the econom y . In particular, at the b eginning of eac h p erio d (that
is, in eac h stage of the game), the y oung, who act as dictators, c ho ose the shares
of their lab or income that they w an t to dev ote to p ensions for the curren t old and
to in v estmen t in public capital. W e can sho w that, whenev er the p otential gains
from gro wth are large enough, an outcome c haracterized by sustained balanced
gro wth can b e supp orted as a subgame-p erfect Nash equilibrium of the in￿nitely
rep eated in tergenerational game. The credible threat to b e denied the en titlement
to p ensions in old age by the follo wing generation deters the curren t y oung from
defecting by not pa ying p ensions to the co existing old.
8
This equilibrium can b e in terpreted as the creation by the so ciet y of an infor-
mal constrain t (so cial norm) such that the y oung transfer resources to the old and
carry out in v estmen ts that will b ene￿t the future generations, in exchange for the
old’s previous in v estmen t and exp ecting the future generation to follo w the same
7
The ￿rst author to analyze a median voter mo del of so cial securit y was Bro wning [ 12 ]. A
surv ey of mo dels of voting for so cial securit y that follo w ed and extended Bro wning’s con tribution
can b e found in Boadwa y and Wildasin [ 8 ]. See also T ab ellini [ 30 ].
8
Notice that the agents that are called on to act in eac h stage of the game are in ev ery respect
identical. Therefore, in order to c haracterize their optimal course of action, we simply need to
solv e standard maximization problems.
6medical pa yments when old...Public exp enditure on the elderly , together with
public in v estmen t, can ￿ll the v oid left by the breakdo wn of so cial norms in
mo dern so cieties..." that imp osed on the adult mem b ers of the family the burden
of in v esting in the o￿spring’s assets and of supp orting the elderly . Beck er do es
not mo del formally ho w such in tergenerational agreemen t should emerge and b e
enforced, nor do es he explain in detail its c haracteristics or the consequences for
gro wth of its in tro duction, whic h is indeed our scop e.
? ? ?
W e think of ￿scal p olicies as endogenous v ariables whic h are determined through
the aggregation of individual preferences by some mec hanism such as ma jorit y v ot-
ing. In the context of dynamic mo dels, a ma jor conceptual problem arises. The
di￿cult y has to do with the relation b et w een curren t and future p olicy c hoices,
the in teraction b et w een p olicy and state v ariables and with the w a y exp ectations
on future p olicies are formed.
On one hand, it is w ell kno wn from the public c hoice literature on so cial secu-
rit y , that, if the future level of p ension b ene￿ts is b eliev ed to b e indep enden t of
the curren t one (agen ts take future p olicy c hoices as giv en, when deciding on the
curren t ones), a p ositiv e lev el of redistribution can nev er arise as a p olitical equi-
librium, unless the old are p olitically predominant. Since there are no incen tiv es
to pa y p ensions at an y p oint in time, the only rational exp ectation on the future
level of transfers is zero. In our setup this implies that public in v estmen t is also
set equal to zero.
In order to obtain a relation b et w een transfers, public in v estmen t and gro wth,
w e need to extend the agen ts’ rationality to encompass strategic b ehaviour. In
other w ords, w e need to assume that the agen ts recognize that future p olicy c hoices
dep end on the curren t ones. How ev er, the in teraction b et w een state v ariables and
the agen ts’ strategic incentiv es quickly mak es the analysis v ery complicated in
general, ev en in standard dynamic mo dels.
6
This is where our simple setup helps.
In fact, most complications can b e a voided in our mo del due to the small op en
economy assumption and preferences homotheticit y .
6
F or a rigorous analysis of dynamic p olitico-economic equilibria, see Krusell, Quadrini and
Rios-Rull [ 20 ] and Krusell and Rios-Rull [ 19 ].
5share of the tax rev en ues to in tergenerational redistribution in eac h p erio d can
render otherwise impraticable p ositiv e levels of taxation and public in v estmen t
p olitically viable and allow the economy to take-o￿.
Notice that a fully funded system w ould not achiev e the same result, since the
rate of return from that system is exogenous and equal to the w orldwide in terest
rate.
? ? ?
The relation b et w een redistribution, so cial cohesion and gro wth w e come to
describ e has b een prop osed by p olitical scien tists and economists in di￿eren t con-
texts. The dev elopmen t of so cial securit y systems in continen tal Europ e and the
U.S. b et w een the nineteenth and tw entieth cen turies has b een explained as an
atteimpt of the ruling class to bind the w orkers’ to the State, in resp onse to the
so cial unrest asso ciated to fast economic gro wth and the spreading of the So cialist
mo vemen t (Rimlinger [ 25 ]). This idea also p ermeates the Solidaristic approac h
to dev elopmen t of the small North-European coun tries, where the expansion of
the W elfare State has b een an imp ortan t p olitical concomitan t of lib eral trade
and gro wth-orien ted p olicies (Katzenstein [ 16 ], [ 17 ]). Besides, the p o or economic
p erformance of some Latin American coun tries is sometimes explained as a con-
sequence of the deep so cial con￿ict that, in the virtual absence of a W elfare State
ev ening out the e￿ects of economic gro wth, leads to frequen t upsurges of so cial
discontempt that put gro wth and mark et-orien ted p olicies at stak e (Sachs [ 26 ]).
Our in terpretation of the so cial security system as an institution capable of
enlarging the (p olitical) supp ort for gro wth-orien ted p olicies, is also v ery close in
spirit to the notion of W elfare State delineated by Gary Bec k er in his T r e atise
on the family . As Bec k er puts it (pp. 370, [ 6 ]): "...exp enditures on the elderly
are part of a so cial compact b et w een generations. T axes on adults help ￿nance
e￿cien t in v estmen ts in c hildren. In return, adults receiv e public p ensions and
where gro wth is led by human capital accum ulation, Boldrin [ 10 ] shows that no-gro wth equilibria
can arise also in the case of closed economies, at least at the initial stages of dev elopment. This
happ ens b ecause the return from in v estmen t in public education, from the p oin t of view of
taxpa y ers, is lo w when the share of income dev oted to in v estmen t in physical capital is small
relativ e to its return.
4by public in v estmen t in capital go o ds.
4
Public in v estmen t needs to b e ￿nanced
through tax rev en ues. The feasible level of ￿scal pressure and the allo cation of
the go v ernemen t budget to di￿eren t exp enditure comp onen ts tends to re￿ect the
in terests of a ma jorit y of the p opulation and is agreed up on collectiv ely . Hetero-
geneous agen ts b ear di￿eren t costs and enjoy di￿eren t gains in the gro wth pro cess.
Redistribution ma y help at ev ening out such di￿erences, create p olitical supp ort
for taxation and b o ost the tax rev en ues a v ailable for go v ernmen t exp enditure.
In particular, consider a small op en economy and assume that while no imp ed-
iments exist to the mobilit y of priv ate ￿nancial w ealth across national b orders,
other factors of pro duction, such as lab or and public capital, are non-tradable.
Heterogeneit y is in tro duced by assuming that the econom y is p opulated by o v er-
lapping generations of ￿nitely-liv ed and non-altruistic agen ts living for tw o p eri-
o ds. Except for age, agen ts are iden tical. Agen ts w ork, sa ve and pa y taxes when
y oung and receiv e a retiremen t p ension b ene￿t on top of priv ate sa vings when old.
T axation falls on lab or income alone. Since lab or supply is inelastic, this amoun ts
to lump-sum taxation. How ev er, tax rev en ues collection is costly: this is the only
source of distortion in our setup.
In this context, w e argue that the en titlemen tt o indexe d-to-wages p ension
payments at retiremen t in a pure pa y-as-y ou-go system, ￿nanced out of contribu-
tory taxation, may pro vide the taxpa y ers with the incen tiv es to supp ort gro wth-
orien ted p olicies, since it mak es them able to reap some of the b ene￿ts deriving
from increased taxation that w ould otherwise b e inaccessible to them. In the
absence of in tergenerational redistribution, sustained gro wth w ould b e p olitically
impracticable, though tec hnically and economically feasible. Indeed, the b ene￿ts
deriving from (public in v estmen t driv en) gro wth are appropriable by taxpa y ers
through tw o c hannels: the increased marginal pro ductivit y of priv ate capital and
the gro wth of unit w ages. The latter is lost at retiremen t. The former is not ev en
at w ork, in a small op en econom y with complete capital mobilit y , since the in terest
rate is ￿xed at the w orld-wide lev el.
5
Therefore the agreemen t to allo cate some
4
Public in v estmen t in capital go o ds includes in v estmen t in infrastructure, health facilities
and human capital.
5
In the con text of an o v erlapping generation mo del where partially altruistic agents vote on
the level of public education in the absence of other forms of in tergenerational redistribution and
3sto c k of public debt, and consists of p ensions, unemplo ymen t and health b ene-
￿ts alone. Both redistributiv e exp enditure and public in v estmen t app ear to b e
p ositiv ely correlated with gro wth. Also, redistributiv e exp enditure and public in-
v estmen t are p ositiv ely correlated. When other relev an t e￿ects are controlled for,
including measures of the initial level of dev elopmen t, domestic in v estmen t (pub-
lic and priv ate), scholarization, go v ernmen t consumption and p olitical instability ,




W e b eliev e that the p ositiv e e￿ect of redistributiv e p olicies on accum ulation
suggested by data can b e explained incorp orating p olitics in a standard gro wth
mo del. The bulk of the recen t p olitical econom y mo dels of gro wth argue that the
comp osition of so cial con￿icts ma y lead to extensiv e redistribution whic h has a
depressiv e e￿ect on gro wth.
2
Though this in tuition is app ealing, w e think that
it needs quali￿cations. As long as redistribution plays a role in buying so cial
c onsensus for gro wth-orien ted activities, it may w ell foster rather than depress
gro wth.
3
Redistribution ev ens up the costs and b ene￿ts of gro wth across so cial
classes. If redistribution mak es gro wth so cially palatable, the absence of adequate
redistributiv e programs ma y fuel a deep so cial con￿ict resulting in p o or economic
and gro wth p erformance. The presen t pap er explores this in tuition and puts
forw ard a motiv ation for wh y redistributiv e and gro wth-orien ted p olicies, though
comp eting for scarce tax rev en ues, migh t go hand in hand and bring ab out fast
economic gro wth.
The situation w e ha v e in mind is one where sustained gro wth is generated
1
Regressions displa ying the a v erage gro wth rate as the dep enden tv ariable and including
various comp onen ts of go v ernment exp enditure among regressors have b een prop osed, among
others, by Barro and Sala-y-Martin [ 5 ], Easterly [ 15 ], P erotti [ 22 ] and Sala-y-Martin [ 29 ]. Sala-
Y-Martin [ 29 ] explicitely men tions the surprisingly p ositiv e co e￿cien t of transfers.
2
See for instance Alesina and Ro dric k [ 1 ], Bertola [ 7 ], Krusell, Quadrini and Rios-Rull [ 20 ],
Perotti [ 23 ], P ersson and T ab ellini [ 24 ].
3
Sala-y-Martin [ 29 ] provides a di￿eren t explanation, where p ensions ma y increase gro wth if
they are used to force umpro ductiv e old work ers out of the pro duction pro cess.
21. In tro du ction
Most of the recen t economic gro wth mo dels predict that purely redistributiv e
p olicies, such as so cial securit y programs, should depress gro wth through ￿nan-
cial crowding out and the adv erse incen tiv e e￿ects asso ciated with distortionary
taxation. On the other hand, accum ulation ma y b e p ositiv ely asso ciated with
gov ernmen t exp enditure on education and with public in v estmen t in infrastruc-
ture or other pro ductiv e activities. A t times where industrialized coun tries are
confron ted with the issue of establishing and main taining a sound ￿scal p olicy
while fostering economic gro wth, the trade-o￿ b et w een pro ductiv e and redistribu-
tiv e go v ernmen t exp enditures b ecomes esp ecially harsh and p olicy prescriptions
calling for a rede￿nition of the nature and scop e of the W elfare State gain adv o-
cates.
How ev er, these predictions are not en tirely supp orted by data. Some evidence
can in fact b e pro vided regarding the existence of a positive asso ciation b et w een
redistributiv e exp enditures as a p ercen tage of GDP and the long run gro wth
rate. The follo wing table rep orts the correlation co e￿cien ts b et w een the a verage





, the a verage






and the a verage
annual gro wth rate of real GDP ( x ), in a sample of 72 coun tries for whic h the
relev an t observ ations are a v ailable, in the p erio d 1970-85.
T able 1- Correlation Matrix

















The redistributiv e v ariable TR is calculated as the di￿erence b et w een go v ern-
men t transfers to the priv ate sector and in terest pa yments on the outstanding
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Abstract
This pap er dev elops a mo del of endogenous gro wth with o v erlapping
generations to in vestigate the join t determination of so cial securit y , public
investmen t and gro wth in a small op en economy .W e argue that a pure
pay-as-y ou-go system pro vides the taxpa y ers with the incen tiv es to supp ort
gro wth-orien ted p olicies, whic h increase the future pro ductivit y of lab or.
W e ￿nd that outcomes c haracterized b y p ositiv e lev els of in tergenerational
redistribution, public in vestmen t and long run gro wth can b e sustained as
subgame-p erfect Nash equilibria of an in￿nitely rep eated in tergenerational
game, if and only if the marginal pro ductivit y of public capital is large
enough. F urthermore, we show that transfers either como v e with public
investmen t and gro wth or displa y a non-monotonic relation, where they
initially increase along with public in vestmen t and gro wth and then de-
crease. ( JEL, E62, H55)
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